Organisational change and the computerisation of British and Spanish savings banks, 1965-1985 by Batiz-Lazo, Bernardo & Maixe-Altes, J. Carles
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Organisational change and the
computerisation of British and Spanish
savings banks, 1965-1985
Bernardo Batiz-Lazo and J. Carles Maixe-Altes
June 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/804/
MPRA Paper No. 804, posted 13. November 2006
 The computerisation of British and Spanish savings banks, 
1960-2000 
 
Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo and J. Carles Maixé-Altés 
 
 
Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo is a senior lecturer at the Bristol Business School, Frenchay 
Campus, Coldharbour Lane, Bristol BS16 1QY,  United Kingdom (tel +44 (0)117 328 
36 10; fax +44 (0)117 328 22 89); e-mail:  bernardo.batiz@1998.alumni.man.ac.uk.  
 
J. Carles Maixé-Altés is a senior lecturer of Economic History at Departamento de 
Economía Aplicada I - Universidad de A Coruña , Campus de Elviña s/n, 15071 A 
Coruña, Spain (tel +34 981 167000 ext. 2569; fax +34 981 167070); e-mail: 
maixe@udc.es   
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article we explore organisational changes associated with the automation of 
financial intermediaries in Spain and the UK. This international comparison looks at 
the evolution of the same organisational form in two distinct competitive 
environments. Changes in regulation and technological developments (particularly 
applications of information technology) are said to be responsible for enhancing 
competitiveness of retail finance. Archival research on the evolution of savings banks 
helps to ascertain how, prior to competitive changes taking place, participants in bank 
markets had to develop capabilities to compete.  
Keywords : comparative financial markets, United Kingdom, Spain, market structure, 
technological change, regulatory change, savings banks, banks. 
* WORK IN PROGRESS. DO NOT QUOTE * 
1 Introduction 
Alton Gilbert’s landmark compilation warned that, conspicuously absent from the 
analysis of structure-conduct-performance in banking, was an assessment of the 
effects regulatory change has had in determining bank performance (Gilbert, 1984). 
More recently an important number of contributions have emerged to debate the 
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economic role of market competition, its benefits and its workings in financial 
mediation (Cetorelli, 2001). This article considers research that contributes to an 
investigation into the effects of technological change on performance in bank markets. 
This is done by looking into how and why capabilities to compete emerged in the 
context of changed competition (as reflected by distinct competitive environments in 
the United Kingdom and Spain). The combination of secondary sources and 
previously unavailable archival material, suggests a wide spectrum in the 
organisational forms adopted by collaborators. What is distinctive about the forms of 
collaboration explored in this article is the focus on the importance attributed to 
assessing market potential as the driver that brought collaborators together. 
 In what follows, the research presented in this paper explores competitive 
collaboration by taking the view that the only, relevant costs to enter a market are 
those known to be sunk and which can become exit barriers (Baumol et al., 1982) 
(Thorelli, 1986) (Dietrich, 1994). From the ‘contestable market’ perspective, the 
degree of competition diminishes through means other than those facilitating 
collusion or reducing the number of independent participants. Competitive pressures 
are lower to the extent that known sunk costs reduce the threat of out-of-market 
participants entering the market. Strategic orientation is important to anticipate 
competitive advantage, including withstanding environmental turbulence  which can 
unexpectedly turn idiosyncratic investments into exit barriers. 
Before proceeding three caveats must be considered. First, the nature of 
mechanisation and the type of technology introduced to achieve ‘modernity’ and 
‘competitive advantage’ is a significant part of this article. Ours is not a tale of 
technological determinism. Rather we believe that savings banks in Spain and the UK 
attempted to assess the costs and benefits associated with the adoption of new 
technologies and act appropriately but, in so doing, were fully aware of the 
environment in which they undertook their business. Technology is seen as 
constructed primarily out of the interaction of policy decisions by senior bank staff 
and consumption decisions by banks’ customers. Choice is therefore central to our 
tale of technological change (Malone et al., 1987; Yates, 1999).  
Second, along side the changing nature of competition and technological 
progress, philanthropy was another distinctive feature of savings banks in Britain and 
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Spain However, as the social and regional dimension gathered strength at the Spanish 
‘cajas de ahorro’, savings banks in Britain became ever more business like. For the 
directors of British savings banks achieving competitive advantage replaced educating 
the poorest of the poor in the habit of thrift as the main operating priority. Although in 
Spain political considerations (and appointees) have played an important role in 
explaining the long term survival of the Spanish savings banks, their commitment to 
invest in the overall well being of the city or region is also undisputable. However, in 
this article economic rather than social considerations are the focus to explain the long 
term performance of savings banks in Spain and the UK. A holistic analysis of 
Spanish ‘cajas de ahorro’ and trustees savings banks would be most desirable to do 
justice to their long history but space considerations override such analysis. 
Third, during the twentieth century Britain and Spain changed in significant 
ways. Financial intermediaries played their part in fostering and responding to these 
changes, be they economic, legal, social, or political. Consequently, there are parts in 
this story for a number of factors additional to the onward march of technological 
progress; among these can be included: increased professionalism, and the 
development of the managerial class; changing perceptions of gender; the impact of 
war; and the role of the state. Although new technology underpins these 
developments, these are the themes which also enlighten our story. 
The article proceeds as follows. The second section details the emergence and 
growth of savings banks in the UK and Spain. Of particular importance is the creation 
of central providers of services. These allowed loose alliances of small and 
geographically dispersed intermediaries invest in computer technology and in turn, 
achieve critical scale in retail banking markets. The third section tells of 
computerisation in Britain while the fourth of the same process in Spain. The fifth and 
final section summarises and puts forward some tentative conclusions. 
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2 Common origins  
2.1 Emergence of savings banks in the UK 
This article reports on research into the role the mechanisation and automation of 
practices within retail financial intermediaries aiming to contest bank markets. The 
research was conducted through an historical evaluation of associations in two 
different competitive environments and provides an international comparison. An 
historical analysis of collaboration enabled the assessment of organisational 
transformation from the inception of collaborators in the market to the eventual 
success or failure of the agreement. The financial service organisations, which are the 
topic of this article, were originally established as independent providers but all were 
guided by a common principle. This unifying concept dates to 1810 when the first 
‘savings’ bank was established in Ruthwell, Scotland (Lawton, 1950).  
 From the outset savings banks were retail finance institutions organised as 
mutuals: owned by depositors and generally operated through democratic and 
philanthropic guidelines. Savings banks sought to create thrifty habits amongst small 
and medium-sized savers like craftsmen, house servants or the growing proletariat, 
that is, outside the banks' target market (Payne, 1967; Tedde de Lorca, 1991; Ross, 
2002a). In the first half of the 19th century, bank-runs or bank collapses were 
common, so savings banks had no safe outlet for deposits. To create trust among 
potential depositors and as a matter of policy, funds from 1817 onwards were invested 
in government bonds or deposited at the Bank of England (Lawton, 1950). This 
regulation was extended to Scottish savings banks in 1835. From then on regulation of 
savings banks in the UK characterised as quite detailed. Several periods of “ill-health” 
and lack of trust on their capacity as a viable organisational form (Horne, 1947), 
resulted on government intervention most aspects for the operation and day to day 
management of savings banks (particularly the nature of the business portfolio). 
 There were other forms of savings banks in the UK (including a National Savings 
Bank and the Post Office Savings Bank) but the discussion only deals with so called 
trustees savings banks. Revell (1973) points out that an essential feature of a savings 
bank in the UK was that depositors should have a guarantee of the nominal value of 
their savings so that these could be withdrawn at their full value plus interest (no 
matter how long the deposit had been with the bank.) Funds of the savings banks 
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would be under control of voluntary managers or trustees (hence the roots of the TSB 
acronym). The guarantee could not be achieved unless funds were invested in 
securities with a similar guarantee. As a result of the Act of Parliament of 1817 the 
payment of all money received by trustees savings banks, other than that needed for 
liquidity to deal with every day transactions, was transferred to the Bank of England 
for the Credit of the National Debt Commissioners. The Act also specified the duties 
of the treasurers, managers and trustees of the savings banks, none of whom was to 
derive any benefit what so ever from that office. This feature was to dominate the 
management of the TSB's until the 1970s.  
 Savings banks paying interest on deposits (at a rate ranging from three to five per 
cent per annum) proliferated. The number of successful institutions in the UK grew 
until it reached 645 in 1861 (Tedde de Lorca, 1991). This as their business remained 
in collecting low volume deposits as early attempts at market diversification had been 
curtailed by the Savings Bank Act of 1891.   
 The potential of trustees savings banks to contest retail bank markets became 
evident in the interwar years (Saville, 1996). By 1919 the sum of cash and assets held 
in deposit for all the TSB reached their first £100 million, which rapidly rose to £162 
million in 1929 and £292 million in 1939 (Horne, 1947). Thus, in twenty years TSB 
assets doubled the amount accumulated in the century since the passing of the first 
Savings Bank Act (1817).   
 Together, the trustees savings banks would rank in size with any of the four main 
London clearing banks. In practice, however, there was little competition between 
trustees savings banks. Each individual TSB served a separate geographic area, 
although they were actively challenged by other organisations and this competition 
became more acute in the decades that followed the end of the war in 1945.  
 In 1965 a review of retail credit markets led to the TSB being allowed to issue 
current accounts, undertake the payment of utility bills and safeguard securities and 
valuables (Pringle, 1973). Although most customers of trustees savings banks were 
lower middle- and working-class, and had little need for cheques (Moss et al., 1992), 
regulatory innovations which opened possibilities for diversification in the business 
portfolio of the trustees savings banks, threatened to erode the deposit base of the 
clearing banks (Saville, 1996).  
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 In 1970 there were 75 savings banks loosely tied up in an association with £2,806 
million in total assets (Revell, 1973). Size was unevenly distributed. Five of the banks 
had over £100m in assets (together accounting for 25 per cent of the total), 14 had 
between £50 and £100m (35 per cent), 39 between £10 and £50m (38 per cent) and 17 
under £10m (2 per cent) (Revell, 1973). In spite of the largest trustees savings banks 
being based in London, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Belfast, those based in the north of 
England accounted for 50 per cent of total funds, those in the south of England and 
Wales for 27 per cent, those in Scotland for 19 per cent and those in Northern Ireland 
for less than 5 per cent (Revell, 1973). Geographical distribution of the 1,655 trustee 
savings bank branches was also unevenly distributed with branch density higher in 
Scotland and the North of England. Hence, in 1978, there was one savings bank 
branch per 18,000 persons in Scotland, but only one per 75,000 persons in the 
otherwise high density area of London (Price Commission, 1978: 44). A similar 
pattern existed in respect of individual accounts, with two out of five persons in 
Scotland having a savings bank account, one out of five in the north of England but 
only one out of twenty in London and the home counties (Revell, 1973). 
2.2 Savings banks in Spain 
Other European countries adopted the Scottish model early on. This type of savings 
bank was popular in countries with traditional Protestant values of self-help, where 
the ideas of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and Thomas R. Malthus (1776-1834) were 
particularly influential (Tedde de Lorca, 1991; Ros Pérez, 1996). Such was not the 
case in Portugal and Spain where savings banks started rather late (1836 and 1839, 
respectively) and  followed the French ‘model’ (established in 1818).  
 Regulation introduced in 1835 was the first to authorise the establishment of 
savings banks in Spain. This piece of legislation allowed the establishment of 
independent non-profit-orientated institutions which had to be financed by own 
resources. However, it was not clear how individua l institutions would access these 
resources although there were loose references to the expectation that capital would 
be raised as the well-off supplied financial resources as charitable donations. The 
Spanish government clearly displayed a preference for initial investment to come 
from the private sector while individual institutions would provide for some form of 
guarantee to secure funds held in deposit. Financially, however, the ‘model’ of 1835 
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was very weak. Hence, in 1839 a new piece of legislation introduced the ‘French 
model’ where individual savings banks were linked with a ‘Mount of Piety’. 
 Unlike the Scottish savings banks, French-style savings banks created an initial 
fund to cover set-up costs and unexpected losses through donations and setting up a 
charity. After this the banks became autonomous with a governing board of six to 20 
principals (working pro bono) holding responsibility for the strategic direction and 
overall affairs of the banks (Duet, 1983; Gueslin, 1989; Forniés Casals, 1991). Both in 
Portugal and Spain the most common source of the set-up fund was the local ‘Mount 
of Piety’. These ‘Mount of Piety’ (a literal translation from ‘Montes de Piedad’) were 
early modern charitable institutions where advances were made against some kind of 
collateral in pawn (usually, jewellery or clothes).1 Consequently, Spanish savings 
banks would accept low-value and low-volume savings in deposit and, in turn, place 
these funds in the ‘Mounts of Piety’ in order to make small loans to the more 
underprivileged classes (Anton Ramirez, 1876).  
 Like their counterparts in Scotland and France, Spanish savings banks briefly 
placed excess deposits at a government owned institution (Caja General de 
Consignaciones, 1852-68). This portfolio strategy was part of a change in government 
policy looking for greater intervent ion in the business of Spanish savings banks as 
well as providing financial aid to the recently created Caja de Dépositos y 
Consignaciones (Gonzalo Gonzalez, 1981). However, the change in strategy was 
short lived due to the poor quality of government bonds in the 19th century. Instead, 
Spanish savings banks increasingly used deposits exclusively to finance the activities 
of the ‘Mount of Piety’. 
 A turning point in the history of Spanish savings banks came after the Restoration 
of the Monarchy in 1874. Until then was introduced. Until then regulation and 
government policy around savings banks had closely followed the interventionist 
‘French model’. As was the case in Britain, this approach limited the operations of 
savings banks. Legislation introduced in 1880, opened the way for the growth of 
Spanish savings banks as summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: The Savings Banks Act of 29 June 1880 
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Characteristics and Objectives of  Savings Banks 
Aspects not specifically included in the Act of 
1880 but which posed ‘problems’ for the savings 
banks  
• Non-profit private foundations 
• Charities organisations with fiscal exemptions  
• Discretion in the establishment of objectives 
(statutory self-governance) 
• Home Office supervision 
• Basic Operations: 
a) Saving section: deposits  
b) Monte de Piedad: advances were made against 
some kind of collateral in pawn 
(jewellery, clothes or securities) 
• Concession of personal guaranteed loans  
 
• Mortgages 
 
• Stock Portfolio 
 
• Purchase and sale of estates  
 
• Regulation of the policy on new branches and 
agencies   
Sources: Savings Banks Act - 29 June 1880 and author. 
 The left hand column of Table 1 indicated the Act of 1880 had clear objectives for 
the running of savings banks. At the same time, the right hand column suggests there 
were a number of areas which lacked precision in the new introduced regulation. 
However, it was the lack of precision in a number of areas which was to allow the 
growth and development of savings banks in Spain. In particular, ‘freedom’ (i.e. lack 
of detailed regulation) regarding investment policies resulted in diversification and 
growth of assets at a greater rate than counterparts elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, from 
the time the Act of 1880 was published until the end of the 19th century, the number 
of entities doubled from 26 in 1880 to 66 in 1905; while the sum of cash and assets 
held as deposit increased by four percent from 12 per cent of total savings in Spain in 
1880 to 16 percent in 1905. 
 In short, since the 19th century mutual financial organisations have been 
participants in UK and Spanish bank markets. There was little opportunity or indeed 
incentives for collaboration during the initial stages of development of these 
intermediaries. However, throughout the 20th century a potentially wide spectrum of 
organisational forms could be adopted between mutual financial organisations with 
in- and out-of market participants and competitive collaboration was one of these 
organisational forms. In what follows the research assesses the likelihood that actual 
or potential participants in bank markets engage in any or all of these potential 
organisational forms of competitive collaboration. The discussion develops the notion 
that the strategic success of collaboration is based on the transformation over time of 
established participants in bank markets and their adaptation to contextual and 
environmental contingencies. 
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3 Early computing at the trustee savings banks 
Clearing banks adopted second generation2 computer technology during the late 
1950s and early 1960s and as a response to staff shortages and increasing transaction 
volume (Bátiz-Lazo and Boyns, 2003; Bátiz-Lazo and Wardley, 2007). Staff 
shortages responded to increasing turnover of female clerical workers, previously 
unseen migration of staff to other sectors and “a lack of junior recruits of the right 
quality.”3 Along side dealing with the problem of staff shortages, computer 
technology was attractive to banks as it offered a potential alternative to deal with 
limited possibilities to increase premises in high-street branches and thus eliminate 
the need to deal with the increasing volume of paper-based transactions by 
accommodating more clerical staff in already cramped back-office space within retail 
bank branches (Bátiz-Lazo and Wardley, 2007).  
 Banks sourced their computers with different vendors but as had been the case in 
the USA, former suppliers of office machinery such as Burroughs fought hard to 
maintain their links. The largest building societies followed banks and adopted second 
and (mostly) third generation computer technology. As shown in Table 2, Abbey 
National was the first building society introduce a computer in 1963 (an IBM 
compatible Honeywell 401-A) while most other large societies were equipped with an 
IBM/360 system (Co-operative Permanent and the Halifax in 1967; Bradford & 
Bingley in 1968) and with others choosing the local alternative, that is, an ICL 440 
(Leek and Westbourne in 1968; Anglia in 1971).   
 Computerisation at banks and large building societies during the 1960s was 
‘internally driven’. In other words, computerisation moved forward using staff (often 
accountants or member of the Organisation and Methods Department) and 
organisational capabilities built upon their experience with electromechanical 
accounting devices and sorter readers. But by the end of the 1960s outside consultants 
were being actively used to review internal processes and recommend the most 
suitable computer equipment (Bátiz-Lazo and Wardley, 2007).  In contrast, savings 
banks used third generation computers (through time sharing) and fourth generation 
computers (within their organisations). Their drive for computerisation was 
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‘externally driven’ as it often relied on staff and expertise developed outside the TSB 
movement. 
 
Table 2: Adoption of mainframe computers by selected building societies, 1963-82 
 Abbey Co-operative Halifax Leek and Bradford & Anglia West  
 National Permanent  Westbourne Bingley  Bromwich 
Established 1849 1884 1853 1856 1851 1848 1849 
Incorporated 1944 1884 1875 1879 1964 1923 1928 
Achieved national 
branch coverage 1948 1952 1937 1972 1965 n/a n/a 
Adoption of 
mainframe computer 
       
Year installed 1963 1967 1967 1968 1968 1971 1982 
Make and model 
Honeywell 
401-A IBM 360/30 IBM 360/40 
ICL System 
4-40 IBM 360/30 ICL n/a 
ICL/Nixdorf 
n/a 
Asset size at year-end 
of adoption (£000) £559,110 £524,186 £1,295,679 £243,238 £197,096 £298,518 £336,290 
Rank (assets) 2 3 1 8 10 11 23 
Number of retail 
branches  104 127 146 106 72 54 88 
Number of agencies n/a 1,291 N/a 300 n/a n/a 17 
Total membership 844,110 826,426 1,654,832 317,646 246,161 398,281 221,924 
Source: Building Societies Yearbook (1963-82), company histories, authors. 
 The earliest recorded use of a computer by TSB banks was a demographic 
analysis of customers taking up the TSB’s first unit trust offer in 1968.4 Two years 
later a consortium of 13 trustee savings banks signed an agreement to use the Leeds 
centre of the National Data Processing Service (NDPS), an independent subsidiary of 
the Post Office.5 By October 1970 the NDPS centre in Leeds was servicing 23 TSB 
banks and was said to be in the process of incorporating into the computer system 
450,000 accounts and 45,000 standing orders. The aim was for the NDPS computers 
to service 40 percent of saving banks operations, that is, a total of 400 branches, five 
million customers and processing 43 million transactions a year.   
 Clearly, TSB banks wanted to take advantage of the NDPC’s 12 year experience 
in computing and in servicing the National Savings Bank. Press reports pointed to the 
NDPC using an ICL System 470 at the centre in Leeds.6,7 But a significant difference 
in the computerisation of trustee savings banks, with regards to experiences in other 
 11 
financial intermediaries in UK retail finance, was that computers at the savings banks 
were adopted as part of a major organisational change. Organisations equipped with 
LEO aside, other participants in UK retail bank markets and indeed British 
manufacturing typically adopted computers to enhance the efficiency of established 
procedures (usually around the accounting function) (Bátiz-Lazo and Boyns, 2003; 
Bátiz-Lazo and Wardley, 2007).  
 As above mentioned, in 1965 and following a government enquiry into the very 
existence of savings banks, the TSB had been allowed to issue current accounts, 
undertake the payment of utility bills and safeguard securities and valuables (Pringle, 
1973). Although most customers of trustees savings banks were lower middle- and 
working-class, and had little need for cheques (Moss et al., 1992), regulatory 
innovations had opened possibilities for diversification in the business portfolio of the 
trustees savings banks. “The savings banks [were] moving aggressively onwards to 
expand their clientele. Computerization [was] in progress throughout the [TSB] 
movement.”(English, 1972).  
 In 1973 at the time of the report by the Page Committee, there were still 73 
savings banks with 1,549 branch offices (Marshall, 1985). Eight years had passed 
since regulatory change had been allowed for the first time the introduction of cheque 
accounts. The trustee savings banks community sensed the need “to change in 
response to changing customer needs.” (Marshall, 1985).  However, there had been 
mixed developments in the growth of assets at individual banks. On the one hand, the 
assets of the Scottish trustee savings banks, traditionally the strongest members of the 
TSB movement, had been growing more slowly than those of their southern 
counterparts (Revell, 1973: 356). On the other hand, trustees savings banks in 
Lancashire, Yorkshire, Midlands, Welsh countries and West Country had “built up 
enviable reserves and [were] anxious to protect their territories.”8 London and 
southern England still remain the areas where the savings banks little presence. 
 There was frustration amongst directors of the savings banks as their 
organisations had been unable to capture growth opportunities opened by changes in 
regulation, attract new clients nor capitalise on the loyalties of existing depositors. 
 Amongst directors of the individual banks there were differing views about 
reconciling strong regional character with centralising services, including the creation 
of a 'central' trustee savings bank, and about the need for further amalgamation. Board 
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members of individual trustee savings banks were non the wiser. Directors and Board 
members of banks and building societies had long experience in financial 
intermediation and therefore, a wealth of banking experience was to be found in the 
running of these organisations. As non-profit organisations, Board members of 
savings banks (i.e. the trustees) were drawn from public-spirited businessmen and 
members of the professions within the local area of individual banks. Experience in 
banking was then to be found within the paid professionals running individual banks. 
 While savings banks and government were engaged in deliberations about the 
future organisational structure and functioning of the movement as well as of 
individual trustees savings banks (Moss and Russell, 1994), the savings  banks 
remained restricted in what services they could offer. The banks could not give loans 
to their customers and regulation still limited the way funds could be invested. It was 
at this critical stage that the report of the Page Committee recommended that the 
trustee savings banks were freed from government control, allowed to develop its 
service range and as a result, become the “third force in banking.” (Marshall, 1985). 
Trustee savings banks then turned to computers as part of a long effort to articulate 
organisational change. 
 Two companies were set up in 1972 in preparation for future change. One was 
TSB Computer Services Ltd., to co-ordinate all computer systems and related 
developments, the other being the incorporation of the Central Trustee Savings Bank 
Ltd., to deal with volume transactions (Moss and Russell, 1994). It was expected that 
in due course the Central Trustee Savings Bank Ltd. Would become operative as the 
“central bank” for all trustee savings banks.9 
 The creation of TSB Computer Services Ltd. effectively brought home 
computing to the savings banks as it migrated applications away from bureau services 
at the NDPS. The savings banks grouped into five consortia of between five and nine 
banks to move into computer-based accountancy and banking services.10  Each 
consortia built around a centre reflecting the geographical strength of the TSB 
movement (Lancashire, Yorkshire, the Midlands, Wales and South West England). 
Each centre was equipped with an ICL system 4 computer to power a network of 
1,400 Olivetti TC 349 BI terminals. The aim of this extensive network was to forego 
batch processing of paper-based transactions and introduce “on line” processing. That 
is, computer terminals sitting near (or on) each teller would allow all deposits, 
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payments and savings transactions at the counter in savings bank branches to be feed 
(“spooled”) directly into magnetic disks or tapes. Customer accounts’ files would be 
updated at the end of the day.  
 By the end of 1972 computer applications rather than clerks aimed to become the 
main source of data input and file maintenance. This would create the largest 
computer system of its kind in Europe.11 However, change was slow to come. By 
1974 individual banks still expected the Central Trustee Savings Bank to become 
fully operational. Incorporating retail saving bank branches to the computer consortia 
managed by TSB Computer Services Ltd. was also progressing but not expected to be 
fully operational before 1975.12 
4 Scale through a central provider in the UK 
Efforts within the trustee savings banks and within government gave rise to the 
publication of the Trustees Savings Banks Act in 1975. This Bill granted savings 
banks the right to offer equivalent services to those of the clearing banks. But it also 
required that, in the space of one year, their number was reduced from 73 (of varying 
sizes) to 19 independent banks, under the central co-ordinating authority of the TSB 
Central Board. This organisational framework for savings banks was in place between 
1976 and 1984, a period during which TSB management undertook a series of 
fundamental changes while pursuing to create an independent and profitable financial 
services group (Marshall, 1985; Moss and Russell, 1994).  
 Tom Bryans, general manager of the Northern Ireland Trustee Savings Bank, was 
appointed the first new chief executive of the Trustee Savings Banks.13 At the time in 
his mid fifties, he had spent all his working life at the TSB movement, achieving 
“manager status in 1956 and then became an expert in computerized banking.”14 
Bryans took the helm with a mandate to turn the savings banks from a quasi-
government body into successful independent providers – although his salary of 
£17,000 p.a. was well below those paid at similar posts at clearing banks. 
 Although enshrined in the 1975 Act, a central association of savings banks had 
been in place for many years. The Trustee Savings Banks Association was established 
in 18?? but for a long time it remained ineffective in persuading hundreds of small 
savings banks to speak and act as a single body (Horne, 1947).  Spencer (later Sir 
Spencer) Portal was credited with introducing the idea of appointing a permanent 
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secretary and a large Council in 1914 with the aim of deciding a common policy as 
well as a single voice to conduct negotiations with the government and promote 
legislation (Horne, 1947). Portal became deputy chairman of the Association in 1919, 
chairman in 1923 and president when relinquishing his chair in 1935. By the 1930s 
the Association under Spencer Portal was already successful in putting forward a 
common view to Parliamentary Committees and the Treasury to support the progress 
of the savings banks (Horne, 1947). This was important given the detailed regulatory 
framework surrounding the operation of the savings banks. Notable achievements 
included lifting limits on deposits introduced in 1915 as well as major reforms such as 
those of around the Acts of 1929, 1965 and 1975.  The then president secretary-
general of the Trustee Savings Banks Association, Freddie Miller, became deputy 
chief executive of the newly created TSB Central Board, working under Tom 
Bryans.15 
 Throughout its history the Trustee Savings Banks Association failed to act as 
central provider of administrative functions to small independent savings banks. Not 
surprisingly a great number of the 73 banks in existence in 1975 did not have the 
critical scale to compete in British banking. The amalgamation of individual trustees 
savings banks into purposely created regional banks and the establishment of a central 
board in 1975, then brought about the use of own resources to support the 
introduction of personal lending in 1977 (CLCB, 1978: 230). However, by 1979, the 
attempts to diversify across retail bank markets by the trustees savings banks had 
failed. Together with the Giro Bank and the Co-operative Bank the efforts of the 
trustees savings banks to penetrate retail finance, from scratch in 1971, resulted in 
only £200m in direct consumer loans in 1979 and this accounted for less than 3 per 
cent of total consumer lending that year.13  
Applications of computer technology continued to play a role in articulating the 
strategy of the trustee savings banks (Marshall, 1985). In 1983 a new computer centre 
for TSB England and Wales was built in Wythenshawe, with the aim of providing a 
single integrated on-line real time facility throughout  the retail saving bank network. 
In 1984 the government published a White Paper and a new TSB Bill in which the 
quasi- federal decentralised structure was abandoned in favour of a central 
organisation which was no- longer legally unique but incorporated under the 
Companies Act. The aim was to give the then called TSB Group “a more effective 
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operating structure and also establish clear guidelines for ownership and 
accountability, neither of which was clear under former legislation.” (Marshall, 1985). 
 
5 A vertical alliance of Spanish ‘cajas de ahorros’ 
Evidence from Spanish savings banking illustrates how competitive collaboration 
transformed shared experiences, allowed the implementation of opportunistic 
strategies and in turn, the creation of critical mass to effectively contest bank markets 
(see also Bátiz-Lazo and Del Angel, 2003; Bátiz-Lazo, 2004). The relative success of  
the ‘cajas de ahorro’ (i.e. savings banks) entering Spanish bank markets is 
summarised in Table 2, which depicts the growth in the number and relative 
importance of savings banks in Spain. Most early-established savings banks located in 
the biggest urban centres, and grew in financial strength through retained surpluses. 
By the turn of the century most assets were held in the savings banks located in 
seaports and industrial cities.  
Table 3: Growth of Spanish Savings Banks, 1839-2000 
Year 
Total number 
of savings 
banks 
Total number 
of banks in 
CECA* 
Total deposits 
in savings 
banks  (pesetas 
millions) 
Deposits in 
savings banks as 
per cent of total 
deposits in Spain 
(pesetas) 
1839 1 - 0.3 NA 
1850 8 - 4 6.5 
1875 14 - 23 11.2 
1880 26 - 56 12.0 
1885 36 - 73 15.4 
1890 43 - 98 14.1 
1895 43 - 118 16.8 
1900 50 - 131 10.9 
1905 66 - 191 16.2 
1910 94 - 263 19.1 
1915 103 - 401 20.7 
1920 102 - 808 15.6 
1925 153 - 1 437 21.6 
1930 213 82 1 895 19.4 
1935 222 85 2 516 21.9 
1941 - 91 3 361 14.2 
1945 - 81 5 908 16.6 
1950 - 81 13 979 19.0 
1955 - 83 34 119 20.7 
1960 - 83 75 219 22.5 
1965 - 85 216 873 27.8 
1970 - 87 574 676 32.4 
1975 - 88 1 523 857 31.2 
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1980 - 80 3 675 980 31.9 
1985 - 77 8 266 647 39.3 
1990 - 64 14 731 907 44.7 
1995 - 50 23 883 682 48.6 
2000 - 47 36 829 350 52.1 
* Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks or Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro. 
Sources: Anuario Estadístico de España, Memorias de Caja Madrid (Annual Reports); Consejo 
Superior Bancario, Balances de la Banca Privada (1940-1962), Boletín Estadístico del Banco de 
España. (Gonzalo Gonzalez, 1981). Hernández Andreu (coord.), Appendix 3.2. Martín Aceña (1985), 
table II-1 and V-1. Martín Aceña, (1988), table I.2.1 and IV.1. Schwartz (coord.) (1970), Appendix I-4. 
Tedde (2000), p. 251. (Tortella, 1974a) (Tortella, 1974b). 
 
Note: until 1874 the savings banks deposits are estimates based on net accrued balances of deposits and 
annual withdrawals according to Anuario Estadístico de España, 1866-67 (see Martínez Soto (2003), 
p.181). In 1928 when the CECA was created there were 74 savings banks in CECA. 
 
Along side the savings banks, in the 1890s and following German ideas to 
promote agriculture, co-operative banks (‘cajas rurales’) emerged in rural areas. Most 
of these banks were established in the countryside under the auspices of the 
syndicalist, co-operativist movements and the Catholic church. However, these 
intermediaries grew in size until after 1920 (Martínez Soto, 2001). Their impact, 
number and asset size always dwarfed when compared with the achievements of the 
savings banks and as a result, the ‘cajas rurales’ are eventually absorbed by the 
savings banks.  
Between 1870 and 1900 the financial strength of savings banks increased 
significantly. During this period, the pawn and emergency loan operations of the 
Mounts of Piety were unable to absorb all deposits made the savings bank.16 Unlike 
what was a requirement at other European countries, Spanish savings banks were not 
required to purchase government debt with excess resources. Instead, savings banks 
began making short-term advances and issuing mortgages directly to the public (Ros 
Pérez, 1996). Initially they issued short-term loans using public and industrial goods 
in stock as collateral. Between 1862 and 1867, 40 per cent of the amount of the loans 
was granted with the clothing securities and the remaining 60 per cent  was secured by 
stock. Diversification continued and by the outbreak of first world war, Spanish 
savings banks were readily issuing mortgages directly to retail customers (Maixé et 
al., 2003).17 The Mortgage Act of 4 June 1908 contributed to the development of this 
phenomenon as it pioneered exemption from having to pay different forms of capital 
gains and corporation’s tax for mortgages issued by the Mount of Piety. 18 Table 2 
shows that between 1900 and 1925 the number of Spanish savings banks tripled to 
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150 banks, although no major change in regulation policy or the banks' business 
portfolio had taken place. 
 Between 1900 and 1914 the Spanish banking sector experienced a sharp increase 
in its levels of activity. For some this period also observed increased efficiency and 
enhanced competitiveness (Cuadras Morató et al., 2002). Assets of private 
commercial banks grew significantly due to two exceptional circumstances, namely 
the colonial crisis (the repatriation of capital) and the Great War in Europe (the 
growth of business activity under the protection of Spanish neutrality). These 
circumstances favoured the geographical expansion of the regional private 
commercial banks based Madrid and the Basque Country throughout Spain.  
 In 1921 the first banking law was enacted and that year Consejo Superior 
Bancario or CSB (High Banking Council) was established by private commercial 
banks. The role of the CSB was to co-ordinate the actions of private commercial 
banks as their economic power became more important. By the beginning of the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-9), private commercial banks dominated financial markets, 
were organised through the cartel that built around the Consejo Superior Bancario and 
supervised by the Ministry of Employment, Commerce an Industry (and later on by 
the Ministry of Employment and Welfare). 
During the 1920s assets in savings banks started to abandon their charitable 
nature and gradually turned into genuine financial intermediation institutions. Grow 
was limited because competitive pressure to find new sources of growth within the 
private commercial banking sector resulted in a policy to expand the geographic scope 
of retail branches networks and diversify sources of business. These strategies brought 
the competitive challenge of private commercial banks to markets being serviced by 
savings banks. 
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Table 4: Regulatory Constrains on the Activities of the ‘Cajas’, 1921-97  
Supervision of Savings Banks 
Home Office (1921-6) Finance Ministry (1957-71) 
Ministry of Employment, Commerce and 
Industry and Ministry of Employment and 
Welfare (1927-56) 
Bank of Spain (1971-97) 
  
Regulation Limiting Competition and Diversification 
Fixed percentage of deposits invested to be in 
government debt (1926-92) 
Finance Ministry fixes interest rates and 
commission charges (1943-89) 
Special registry to acquire charter as financial 
institution (1929-97) 
Ban on cross-regional retail branch growth 
(1946-64 and 1974-87)19  
Provision for minimum expenditure of social 
charter (1933-79). 
Total ban on new savings banks (1946-64 and 
1975-94) 
Provision for minimum accrual of capital and  
reserves (1933-85). 
Government encourages mergers of 
commercial banks and regional amalgamation 
of savings banks (1975-87) 
Ban on FX  and international trade 
transactions (1933-77) 
Loans and own-social-charter expenditure 
limited to regional scope (1977-87) 
Government control of diversification in loan 
portfolio (1933-89) 
Freedom to set interest rates for assets and 
liabilities with less than 1 year maturity 
(1977) 
Government stimulates growth of the savings 
banks’ retail branch network (1939-63) 
Freedom to set interest rate levels on 
liabilities with more than 6 month maturity 
and total freedom to set interest rates on 
assets (1982) 
Ban on cross regional amalgamation of 
savings banks (1939-88) 
Second Banking Directive comes into effect 
in Spain (1994) 
  
Economic and Political Milestones 
Cartel of commercial banks (1921-38 and 
1946-94) 
Banking mini-reform (1974) 
Private banks begin retail bank branch 
expansion to achieve national exposure 
(1923) 
Fuentes Quintana reform (1977) 
Economic Stabilisation Plan (1959) Spain joins the European Community (1985) 
Sources: Bank of Spain Library; authors. 
 
 Individual savings banks enhanced their profile within their local communities 
as greater asset size allowed them to increase the funding of social welfare- and 
agricultural projects (‘Obra Social’, a practice that is nowadays part of their 
‘corporate social responsibility’). However, a new approach to how people saved and 
to the working environment of savings banks came about as a result of legislation 
 19 
enacted in 1926, 1929 and 1933 during the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera 
(1923-30), a period in which the economic policy was marked by an authoritarian 
corporatism, and the Spanish Republic (1930-6) brought. These regulatory changes 
brought to an end the savings banks charitable nature. They also turned their profits 
into the main source of funds (and therefore to support the ‘Obra Social’ ).  Table 4 
summarises regulatory milestones for Spanish savings banks. These changes 
effectively became the ir operational underpinnings for most of the twentieth century. 
Notably, regulatory innovations put to an end the broad discretion that the previous 
regulation had given to the directors of savings banks and established specific and 
detailed guidelines whose use (and abuse) grew during the dictatorship of General 
Franco (1936-1975). 
 The Franco regime (1939-75), reaffirmed the pre-eminence of private commercial 
banks within the Spanish financial system and, as illustrated in Table 4, introduced 
regulation that handicapped traditional savings banks. Table 4 considers how 
supervision of the savings banks transferred from the Home Office to the Bank of 
Spain. Table 4 also summarises other forces mitigating direct competition in savings 
bank markets as well as Spanish savings banks entering other financial markets. The 
summary in Table 4 gives equal weighting to all barriers to entry and suggests two 
periods of intense regulatory change for the savings banks. The first was the years 
after the Civil War and prior to the Economic Stabilisation Plan (particularly 1951-7). 
The second period of intense regulatory change is somewhat longer and seems to be 
located around the transition to democracy and Spain’s accession to the European 
Union (particularly 1974-87). 
 The context of the first of the episodes of regulatory change for the savings banks 
was characterised by the intensification of regulatory burdens and marked by the 
overwhelming majority of new savings banks, that were established between 1939 
and 1977, being set-up by local and central governments (Forniés Casals, 1991). The 
Franco regime continued implementing a practice developed during the 1920s called 
the ‘principle of territoriality’, meaning that the business of the savings banks was 
restricted to their province. This principle remained an informal arrangement until it 
was enacted into law in 1964.  At the same time, the increasing asset base of the 
savings banks prompted the Finance Ministry to start regulating the sources and 
applications of their funds. As a result, the Finance Ministry directed a growing 
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proportion of the assets of savings banks to finance public debentures and private 
banks' short term liabilities, with the added result that the policy significantly reduced 
funds available for agricultural projects and other traditional lending activities (García 
Delgado, 1985; Serrano and Costas, 1990). 
 The context of the second regulatory change for the savings banks dates to the last 
stage of the Franco regime, when attempts were made to ease the regulatory burden 
on Spanish savings banks (particularly in 1962 and 1964). Nonetheless, until 1974 the 
savings banks remained outside the Spanish clearing house system and had access to 
only a restricted business portfolio. However, under the ‘Fuentes Quintana Reform’ 
(1977), the competitive environments for savings and private banks started to 
converge. The reform gave savings banks strong incentives to modernise their 
infrastructure and develop new skills (Davies, 1987; Caballero Míguez, 2004). In 
1977, for example, the Bank of Spain authorised the first ATMs for the savings banks   
and by 1996, their combined network had 14,169 machines or in a wider context, was 
the biggest network in Spain and the third largest in the world 20. 
 The case of the Spanish savings banks thus suggested that collaboration in 
markets with a handful of participants can enable those with fewer resources and 
capabilities to absorb market intelligence without disrupting competitive equilibria. 
Furthermore, this study offers details on how a Spanish ‘central’ savings bank was 
instrumental for savings banks contesting markets traditionally dominated by 
commercial banks.  
  
5.1 Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks as wholesaler of retail finance 
Spanish savings banks developed a vertical alliance structured through a ‘central’ 
savings bank or wholesaler of retail finance. This kind of institution dated to the early 
20th century and was pioneered by Skopbank in Finland (established in 1908), 
Fellesbanken in Norway and ICCRI in Italy (both established in 1919). ‘Central’ 
banks were membership owned and they had little influence on members’ strategic or 
operational matters. Their aim was to service the needs of participating institutions 
often in a representative capacity but also in areas where necessary economies of 
scale were beyond the individual member (Revell, 1991). In Spain, the ‘central’ or 
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main clearing bank for savings banks was called the Instituto de Crédito de las Cajas 
de Ahorro or ICCA (The Savings Banks Credit Institute).  
 The ICCA was created in 1933 to act as a clearing bank for Spanish savings 
banks. The aim of the new intermediary was to enable pooling of financial resources 
in order to fund or syndicate social-charter investments as well as establishing a 
‘lender of last resort’ scheme for the savings banks. In 1962, ICCA became the 
savings banks’ formal representative at the Ministry of Finance and turned into the 
prime instrument for government control over the savings banks. ICCA formally 
disappeared in 1971, its control and supervision duties were absorbed by the Bank of 
Spain and its clearing functions by the CECA (Comín, 2003; Comín and Torres, 
2005). 
 Between 1921 and 1939, most savings banks remained local institutions but the 
biggest savings banks started to expand within their province and across adjacent 
areas (Forniés Casals, 1991). In the course of the first quarter of the century 
competition increased for the savings banks from two sources (Garcia Delgado, 
1984). First, government-owned banks were established. Secondly, private 
commercial banks developed national branch networks by capitalising on greater 
balance-sheet strength. The process of banking cartelisation took place in conjunction 
with the regulatory change and the conflicts generated by the governmental policies. 
The situation created after the first banking law of 1921 and the simultaneous creation 
of the banking cartel (CSB), generated a series of defence mechanisms put in place by 
the savings banks. First, there were the processes of regional association (the Basque-
Navarre federation in 1924, which was followed by the Galician, Castilian and many 
others, up to eight regional federations) and finally the creation of the ‘Confederación 
Española de Cajas de Ahorros’ in 1928 (CECA –Spanish Confederation of Savings 
Banks), as the independent federations of savings banks amalgamated (Maixé, 2005).  
 Bank federations in Spain emerged as a response to regulatory changes that 
modified the otherwise equal framework for business under which private commercial 
and savings banks could compete. CECA extended the savings banks’ domestic and 
international influence and the ability to lobby on their behalf. Besides its attempts to 
counter balance the commercial banks' cartel (CSB), CECA was used by the Spanish 
government to co-ordinate social charter investment (‘Obra Social’). From 1939, 
CECA also helped to implement a ‘principle of territoriality’, through which savings 
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banks' business was restricted to a single province (Forniés Casals, 1991; Ros Pérez, 
1996). 
 By 1970 the CECA had attained considerable credibility as a savings bank 
association. The reforms that the Confederation had undergone at the start of the 
seventies prepared the institution for future tasks. The CECA, as a collectively owned 
central operator became the main recipient of savings banks’ outsourcing strategies 
(including applications of information technology) and clearing activities. The gradual 
removal of regulatory barriers allowed the CECA, in periods of strong growth of the 
Spanish economy, to offer their associates access to shared resources including 
clearing activities, with the end result of achieving economies of scale that allowed 
independent savings banks the development of previously non-existent competitive 
capabilities. 
  At the end of the 1980s all CECA members remained legally and functionally 
independent and, contrary to other European experiences, the alliance had not grown 
into a single franchise (de la Hucha and Antón, 1991). Although each savings bank 
had an independent treasury department, the risk-diversification of the system meant 
that as a group, the savings banks’ cost of funds was as much as one per cent below 
that of private banks (Grimá i Terré and von Löhneysen, 1991). This advantage 
continued throughout the 1980s and emerged during a period (circa 1962 to 1977) in 
which the savings banks’ collaborative strategies evolved to reduce their competitive 
disadvantage relative to private commercial (i.e. full-service) banks.  
In this way, by the mid 1990s the co-operative mechanisms were sufficiently 
adapted to face market globalization, competition, ever-narrowing financial margins 
in banking and an accelerated pace in technological change. The savings banks were 
able to delve deeper into efficiency and cost reduction, and hence improved their 
competitive advantage viz other financial intermediaries and benefited clearly from 
economies of scale.  
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6 Technological change and market contestability in Spanish savings banks 
6.1 Organizing the change        
From the late 1960s, but more so during the 1970s, the CECA started steering 
towards a more collaborative strategy among its members. This manoeuvre was 
critical for in the following two decades it allowed CECA and its members to 
successfully confront the technological, operative and conceptual changes that came 
about in retail banking. The essence of this strategy was an active policy of co-
operation and shared resources that would allow small and medium-sized savings 
banks access to new technologies and organised markets. As a result, even the smaller 
participants were able to offer products and services in the same conditions as private 
commercial banks. 
 As in the US state banking regime, restrictions to geographic growth limited 
potential economies of scale at Spanish savings banks. The disadvantage was critical 
for two reasons. First, it limited opportunities for market diversification as a 
nationwide market for goods and products that emerged in Spain at the end of the 
Franco regime. Secondly, limited geographic growth restricted consolidation which 
would have been required to benefit from technical change (investments computer 
applications and other shared information and telecommunication technologies). As 
described by one interviewee: 
 
‘Several of our lines [of business] are nurtured by or are left in the hands of 
the Confederation. Perhaps the most strategic aspects [of developing semi-
related business lines] are left to the Confederation. There are different 
committees or working groups to request the development of a new line [of 
business]. There is one called COA and it is the one in charge of overseeing all 
opportunities for joint business. They undertake studies and see whether it is 
more interesting for the smaller banks or for CECA to provide, say, telephone 
banking services. This study is then the subject of consideration by all the 
‘cajas’ and those who want to develop that facility together will then join with 
CECA. Others will wish to develop organically and assume the risks involved. 
As a result, we have no studies [looking at our organisation individually] to 
enter into a new line of business. But you will find many studies exploring 
new opportunities for the whole of the Confederation and they include total 
clients, total expected response, cost levels, etc. Decisions are based on that 
information. Therefore, small and medium sized ‘savings banks’ leave that 
kind of project to CECA. Another very innovative project is the introduction 
of the electronic purse and that too is being developed by the Confederation, 
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once again reflecting how we leave certain strategic aspects to CECA. We 
thus leave any major investment to CECA. We, in turn, avoid ascertaining 
discount factors. Rather our project appraisal entails assessing the incremental 
costs for the [retail] branch network and then [using short term government 
debt as discount factor to] forecast three years of profit and loss statements for 
our caja.’ Interview, Caja de Ahorros de Murcia, 3 Jul. 1996 (Bátiz-Lazo and 
Wood, 1999) 
 
 The long period of geographic restrictions left Spanish savings banks with 
outsourcing as the only option to access scale benefits not attainable individually. As 
a result, collaboration characterised by the organisational structure of a strong and 
successful alliance emerges throughout the history of CECA. This collectively owned 
central operator became the main recipient of the savings banks’ outsourcing 
strategies and clearing activities.  
The corner stone of this policy was CECA’s Comisión de Organización, 
Automatización y Servicios or COAS (Organization, Automation and Service 
commission). The creation of COAS roots to Sitges (Barcelona) in 1969. During the 
World Savings Banks Institute IVth International Conference on Automation, a group 
of directors of Spanish savings banks pointed to the need for a specialised service 
centre that would deal with technology issues within CECA and act as advisor to 
individual savings banks. This was to mirror the Automation Committees at CECA’s 
counterparts in West Germany and Scandinavian countries.21 CECA’s Board (i.e. 
Comision Permanente - forerunner of the current governing body), eventually agreed 
and in February 1970, representatives from 28 savings banks and CECA established 
the Comisión de Organización y Automatización, COA, which eventually became 
COAS. Its main objectives were: 
ü Create a national database for mechanisation 
ü Enable knowledge interchange amongst the savings banks 
ü Study the creation of ‘Centros de Cálculo’ (Computer time sharing 
centres) at a national and regional level 
ü Normalisation of printed material and procedures 
ü Carry out organisational and mechanisation studies 
ü Publish research papers of international standing 
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 It soon became apparent, though, that the COA working party was not to deliver 
expected results. Early in 1971 the process had started to set up an ambitious 
intercommunication project among the savings banks. This project was called SICA 
(Sistema de Intercomunicacion de Cajas de Ahorro – Interconnection Savings Banks 
System) and aimed to be operational by 1978. In setting up this project it became 
evident that the COA and other pre-existing commissions (such as the Current 
Accounts Commission and the Service Commission) were competing among each 
other and therefore a subsequent restructure of CECA’s technical committees was 
required to face the challenge of technology.  
 The result of further deliberations was the creation of COAS as a separate 
charter and its activities in relation to different sub-commissions were clearly set out  
in May 1971.22 COAS membership comprised of directors of savings banks members 
of CECA nominated by CECA’s President-Director General plus a representative of 
CECA’s Board of Directors namely the Secretaria Tecnica (Chief Information 
Officer).23 A new organisational structure was introduced in May 1975 and the 
following year the Secretaria Tecnica was set up as an executive branch of COAS. 
But it was until 1979 when the Secretaria Tecnica became fully operational. 
Membership of COAS aimed to represent all regions and regional federations within 
CECA. Members would then tackle individual project through ad hoc committees.24 
This last organisational change was a clear response to the implications of the 1977 
financial reform (“Reforma Fuentes Quintana”) that “forced a rethink of many of the 
traditional aspects of the savings banks when these entered into open and determined 
competition with other credit facilities already operating in the market”25. In 1999 and 
2003 further modifications took place and its norms were updated.  
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Figure 1: Achieving Scale through Co-operation in Spanish Savings Banks, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: CECA, authors. 
Note: number of savings banks in brackets 
 
Figure 1 summarises the results of a long co-operative process amongst 
Spanish savings banks to achieve scale in different applications of information and 
telecommunication technologies (IT). CECA’s role has been instrumental as a service 
provider and catalyst for co-operation, which current ly covers several different fields 
ranging from the services offered by CECA to participation in joint ventures (CECA 
and Savings banks) in the insurance sector, equity agencies, debit card issuers and IT 
services providers.  
In broad terms, the thrust of technological change and innovation in the 
Spanish savings banks came about as a result of several factors. On the one hand, 
individual initiatives from the larger savings banks converged with the synergies 
generated by co-operation within CECA itself. On the other hand, technological 
change accelerated. This was fuelled by the adoption of computer technology within 
other financial intermediaries (primarily commercial banks) as well as regulatory 
change increased the potential threat of entry by new competitors (including 
diversification into retail bank markets of established competitors with similar 
capabilities such as insurance companies). Regulatory changes in Spain responded to 
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economic policies of the new democratic government and to international 
developments, such as Spain’s accession to then European Economic Community in 
1985 and later on, the adoption of international capital standards under the Basle 
agreement. 
Finally a ‘knock on effect’ came about as a result of changes and innovations 
that were taking place in other countries. By the 1980s, Spanish savings banks were 
already poised towards seeking efficiency and improvement of their services and 
‘brand’.  
6.2 An Appraisal of Information Technology in Spanish Savings Banks Sector 
 CECA, therefore, went beyond creating scale and capabilities in IT or clearing 
activities and began to develop and supply financial services to retail members. These 
services included currency dealing, leasing, credit card management and factoring. 
 From 1975 to 1985 the ‘big’ savings banks actively engaged in CECA's activities 
as there were no major operational or strategy distinctions between them and the 
‘small’ savings banks (Ash, 1987). The association of ‘big’ savings banks continued 
while all the savings banks could benefit from the troubles of the commercial bank 
sector, which resulted in the growth of advantages and profits for the savings banks  
(Ash, 1987). However, reduced rates of market penetration increasingly turned CECA 
into the defender of the smaller savings banks and this was accentuated as bigger 
savings banks pursued distinctive diversification moves such as their own 
international departments or the purchase of failed co-operative banks (circa 1987). 
The ominous trend for CECA changed in the mid-1990s and was associated with the 
savings banks having to update IT investments, a new general manager being named 
for CECA (Juan R. Quintás, a former management consultant), and renewed 
importance for CECA as the ‘central’ Spanish savings bank. 
 In brief, competitive collaboration between Spanish savings banks led to the 
development of CECA in 1928. CECA then encompassed a group of financial 
intermediaries that for a very long period of time had their business potential and 
diversification opportunities (in bank markets) limited by regulation. However, 
economic growth in Spain during the 1980s and early 1990s, domestic regulatory 
change and the adoption of IT applications allowed these mutual financial 
intermediaries to achieve successful diversification in Spanish bank markets. Some of 
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these opportunities for growth were opened by managers of individual savings banks 
while others were only achievable through co-operation within CECA. Tactical 
strategies of savings banks thus resulted in high sustainability of competitive 
advantage for the whole co-operation agreement. 
 Another source of advantage emerged around the restrictions on product and 
market diversification. These restrictions resulted in a focus of the business of the 
savings banks on servicing private individuals and small and medium sized firms. The 
savings banks thus obtained a dominant market position amongst lower-income 
customers but also in the Spanish middle class. The retail focus thus engendered a 
strong competitive base in the late 1970s as the savings banks gained greater 
operative freedom. Moreover, the period of growth coincided with a crisis amongst 
their main competitors, the commercial banks, from 1977 to 1985.  
 The cost-sharing network of CECA worked well, simplified achieving control at 
the caja level, and provided savings banks with a low cost-base that helped them deal 
with the long economic downturn associated with the energy crises and the end of 
Franco’s regime (Fanjul and Maravall, 1985; Caminal et al., 1990). Strong regional 
ties and effective use of IT also helped Spanish savings banks to increase their share 
of deposits (which in any event was being eroded at the top end by growing bank 
disintermediation). During this period, savings banks’ share of deposits grew from 
27.8 per cent in 1965 to 32 per cent in 1980 and to 44.7 per cent in 1990 (table 2). 
 This growth was mainly at the expense of commercial banks who had enjoyed an 
unusually large portion of total national assets by international standards. Indeed, in 
1989 Spanish commercial banks held 73 per cent of total liquid assets while this ratio 
averaged between 24 and 50 per cent in other European countries (Grimá i Terré and 
von Löhneysen, 1991). However, much of the Spanish growth had been fuelled by 
investments in large multinationals who required investments and international 
banking services which were not the strengths of the Spanish commercial banks. Also 
these newcomers tended to acquire or displace indigenous Spanish companies further 
eroding the customer base of the Spanish commercial banks. 
 Changes in the ability to compete forced commercial banks to redirect their 
attention to retail customers and thus to start to pay interest on current accounts. Their 
aim was to increase their share of deposits but also reduce the savings banks’ share of 
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retail banking. The move was initiated in October 1989 but this effort effectively 
broke the Spanish banking cartel and was followed by a mortgage rate war. Despite 
the actions of commercial banks, the alliance structure of the savings banks remained 
intact and savings banks continued growing and even gained market share (Caminal et 
al., 1990; Neven, 1990; Canals, 1994).  
 The relative success of savings banks in securing leadership of Spanish retail 
finance in spite of commercial banks’ efforts to the contrary, gives an insight into the 
sources of the savings banks' competitive advantage. Anecdotal evidence suggested 
that the savings banks’ competitive advantage was built upon market specialisation as 
their shared strategy seemed to work despite wide variations in savings banks’ sizes 
(Bátiz-Lazo and Wood, 1999; Bátiz-Lazo and Wood, 2003). Once savings- and 
commercial banks operated under the same regulatory framework (from 1985) and 
increasingly began to compete for the same sources of income, the lower cost base of 
decentralised simplicity and centralised complexity became clearer. However, 
econometric analysis suggested that market focus and specialisation did not solely 
account for superior performance (Sánchez Sáez and Sastre de Miguel, 1995). This 
research established that equivalent size commercial-  and savings banks had distinct 
differences in their commercial and financial capabilities. In effect, distinctive 
management practices resulted in cost differences beyond what was explained by 
market specialisation (Domenech, 1993; Sánchez Sáez and Sastre de Miguel, 1995).  
In other words, some savings banks enjoyed additional operational efficiencies to the 
benefits attributed to the CECA alliance. 
Table 5 summarises the process that the cajas have followed in adopting IT 
applications from the late sixties onwards based on the framework developed by 
Batiz-Lazo and Wood (2002) who have looked at IT adoption processes in banking 
from a historical perspective. Among the first initiatives put in place by the COAS 
working groups was to design an interconnection system for data transmission among 
cajas using the telephone network. Started in 1968, Intertelex was launched in 1970 
by CECA in partnership with the Compañia Telefonica Nacional de España. On-line 
connection was established in 1974 linking the computers of four of the biggest 
savings banks – Barcelona, Pensiones de Barcelona, Zaragoza and Bilbao. The 
remaining savings banks linked up through terminals. This system was called  
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‘Sistema de Interconexion de las Cajas de Ahorro’ or SICA (Savings Banks 
Electronic Clearing).  
 
Table 5: Adoption of IT applications in Spanish savings banks (1968-2005) 
Period Technology and Operacional Functions 
Emergence 
(1968-79) 
?  SICA (Savings banks electronic clearing): previous development using first National 
Phone Company data transmission network (1968).  
?  BankAmericard (1971), by Banco de Bilbao 
?  Cheque guarantee cards (1973-88): first project of ‘Tarjeta 6000’ (savings banks card) 
?  Primeros proyectos para la domiciliación de recibos (1973-9) 
?  Mecanización de las nóminas de los empleados de las cajas (1974-6) 
?  Domiciliación de la nóminas de clientes de las cajas (desde 1979)  
?  Visa España (1979). First payment network: 56 banks, savings banks and cooperative 
banks) 
?  4B System (1979). Second payment network: Banesto, Banco Central, Banco Hispano 
Americano and Banco Santander). Member of International Visa 
?  Euro 6000. Third payment network: 35 savings banks, centralized by CECA 
?  Auto 6000 (1979): fuel cheque 
Difusión 
(1980-95) 
?  SWIFT: international access (1980/1988) 
?  CCI  (1980-4) and CTB (1984- ) Bank and Savings banks organization for clearing 
operations and operative services  
?  Debit card ‘tarjeta 6000’ (1981) 
?  ATM - off line: 1981-89, 47 savings banks 
?  Savings banks European project (1984-88): ATM service (CECA, IPACRI (Italy) and 
TSB (UK). EUFISERV (1990): a international company for ATM development. 
CECA adapted their ‘tarjeta 6000’ and connected with VISA and PLUS networks 
?  RJE, IFI and TAF (1985-87): desarrollo previo a la union de ordenadores de la CECA 
y cajas de ahorro usando bandas magnéticas y transmisión por lotes.  
?  Credit card (1985), ‘tarjeta 6000’ ( Savings banks-CECA) and Servired (1985): Visa 
system 
?  Central de Recibos de la CECA (1986): normaliza el sistema de domiciliación de 
pagos 
?  EFTPOS (1986). Las primeras propuestas se habían dado en 1981 
?  ATM – on line: 1987, CECA and savings banks 
?  SITO –Sistema de Intercambio y Tratamiento de Operaciones (1988):  union de 
ordenadores on line entre todas las cajas (el proyecto se había iniciado en 1974-78) 
?  Savings banks 6000 Network agreement with 4B Network (1989) and Servired (1994) 
?  First generation of smart cards: TIBC (banks and savings banks) 
?  EDI Electronic data interchange  for savings banks (1995). First study in 1982 
(videotext, cash management, EDI) 
?  Home Banking (1995) utilizando la via telefónica  
Communication 
and network 
architecture 
(1996-2005) 
?  Seguridad lógica 
?  Canal financiero en Internet 
?  Canal banca telefónica 
?  Adaptación al Euro 
?  Reporting financiero: aplicación NIC 
?  E-Procurement 
?  E-ESCA: formación en internet 
?  Arquitecturas alternativas al mainframe de IBM 
?  SEPA sistema de pagos europeo 
?  The Joint Forum – Basilea II 
?  Version WEB del SBP 
?  WOSA-XFS-JXFS:normalización de dispositivos de autoservicio 
Sources: CECA, Secretaría Técnica de la COAS; Servired and authors 
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The next phase began in 1979, once CECA and the savings banks agreed on 
further developing the SICA by establishing a network directly linking their main 
frame or mini computers (as appropriate); by 1988 all the savings banks had been 
integrated into this system. The transition came about based on transmission systems 
such as RJE, IFI and Tap (compensacion electronica mediante tratamiento de soportes 
– bandas magneticas y transmission por lotes).26 Sadly many of the initiatives 
proposed by CECA –who were leading the field in terms of IT- were disrupted by the 
CTNE’s technological backwardness. Unfortuna tely for CECA, CTNE was the only 
service provider and at the time leader of the Spanish telecommunications industry. 
Initiatives such as VIDEOTEX (an information exchange service between CECA, the 
cajas and home terminals) Cash Management and particularly EDI (electronic data 
interchange) weren’t developed until 1992 and weren’t available before 1995.  
The idea of a computer link was one of COAS’ strategic principles from early 
1970. Its development was bolstered by the growing role of IT in savings banks 
members of CECA and the boom in personal computers. The main initiative in this 
field was SATEICA and the Calculations Centre in Sabadell. All these steps allowed 
CECA to begin a clearly defined policy in regards to payment methods, ATMs, 
EFTPOS, etc from 1980.  
Table 6 shows the ATM adoption process by banks, savings banks and co-
operative banks in relation to the three main networks in the mid-1980s: Red 6000, 
4B and Servired. The first initiatives within CECA were in 1974 following a 
presentation by Bourroughs. Later on in 1979, COAS created a working group with 
the Caja de Pensiones (La Caixa), Caja de Bilbao, Caja de Madrid (Caja Madrid) and 
CECA. By 1980 five trademarks that had been slow in commercial terms had been 
accredited. CECA began a policy to revitalise and promote commercialisation of the 
new service.  
Table 6: ATMs in Spain (1984-90) 
Network 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 
6000 (Savings Banks) 1 315 1 755 3 050 3 954 5 605 9 432 
4B (Banks) 708 795 1 030 1 421 1 681 3 000 
Servired (Banks) - 357 495 563 1 265 2 000 
Total 2 023 2 907 4 575 5 938 8 551 14 432 
Source: CECA and Tirado and Nieto (1991), pp. 121-22. 
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As can be seen from Table 7, by 1982 there were 200 ATMs throughout 19 
provinces. By 1983 the number of cajas in the network was 47 with more than 800 
automatic tellers; this number grew to 1,315 in 1984 and at this time CECA became 
involved in an international project led by the Instituto per L’Automatizacione delle 
Casse di Risparmio Italiane (IPACRI), Italy and British trustee savings banks.  These 
three presented a technical proposal to the European Savings Bank Group in 1985 that 
was developed in 1988. EUFISERV – an international partnership based in Belgium -  
was created in 1990 to start a European project on automatic tellers (Vaencia, 
November 1990). As a result of this collaboration, SEINCA (1988-93) was created 
and it brought together 68 cajas and CECA, IPARCRI and two technology partners - 
Ibermatica ( sponsored by the cajas) and ERITEL(Ibermatica and CNTE).27  
  
Table 7: Savings Banks ATMs in Spain (1986-2000) 
  1982 1983 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Number of machines 200 800 1 315 3 050 5 605 9 432 12 271 14 149 16 548 21 497 24 836 
Number of withdraw 
(millions)  - - - 77 144 240 284 362 328 383 922 
Value of withdraw  
( € millions)  - - - 4 508 9 165 16 516 20 939 28 067 25 261 29 125 57 383 
Source: CECA. 
Table 8: Debit and Credit Cards in Spain (1989-2004) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total debit cards 
Number 
(millions) 
14.7 18.3 21.3 23.6 24.0 23.0 22.3 23.9 24.8 26.9 27.8 31.2 
Value of sales 
(€ millions) - 22 376 26 752 28 617 35 045 35 045 39 182 43 325 48 958 54 295 64 960 74 740 
Total credit cards 
Number 
(millions) 
6.0 7.0 7.7 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.6 9.5 10.7 13.3 14.3 
Value of sales 
(€ millions) 5 244 6 425 7 621 9 139 10 025 11 445 13 075 15 106 17 777 20 764 23 752 27 568 
Savings Banks cards 
Number of debit 
and credit cards 
(millions) 
11.0 12.4 13.8 14.6 15.4 15.2 15.4 16.0 16.6 20.8 20.7 24.8 
Source: CECA, SEMP, SERMEPA and Servired. 
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 CECA also represented savings banks in the international credit card clearing of 
VISA and MasterCard through the Eufiserv network. Wholesale international 
transactions on behalf of the savings banks began in 1988. These services developed 
into representative offices in major international financial centres, a single point for 
SWIFT exchanges, 1,300 correspondent agreements with banks in 88 countries and 
trading operations whereby CECA became the third biggest Spanish player in spot 
currency transactions.28 
 In brief, one of the key elements in savings banks’ competitive advantage 
between 1985 and 1990 was IT (Maudos, 1991). CECA led IT development and this 
allowed the savings banks to benefit from their national coverage. CECA introduced a 
nationwide electronic interbank funds transfer system (IFT), direct salary payments, 
and a state-of-the-art ATM network. These were computer systems designed to 
provide interoperability rather than exclusivity or competitive advantage. 
 Accelerated growth and wider responsibilities created operational and strategic 
problems for CECA (Ash, 1987). CECA originated to service the entire savings bank 
system but voting procedures meant it was dominated by the small savings banks. In 
an effort to retain the business of regional and big savings banks, CECA had to devise 
new ways to share the synergy benefits more favourably with the large savings banks 
(whose business was necessary to create them). CECA therefore set up limited cross-
subsidisation between membership fees and supplied services (Medel Cámara, 1991).  
 The efforts made towards financial soundness and fair pricing policies also 
addressed the need to make substantial IT investments to keep up with developments 
at commercial banks (López, 1993).29 At the time, major savings banks were 
investing in proprietary systems and medium sized institutions were actively 
outsourcing outside the CECA umbrella by transferring management of legacy 
hardware, IT systems and risk-control software to international vendors like Unisys, 
EDS, Microsoft, ICL, Bull or IBM.30  Furthermore, three member savings banks of 
non-neighbouring regions created a joint venture (called ATC, see Table 4) that by-
passed actual and potential services from CECA. Between 1990 and 1994, this 
consortium integrated their electronic banking systems in a joint venture.31 
Consortium members agreed to respect existing geographical boundaries but co-
operated to provide joint capabilities to reduce costs, improve overall skills, and 
customer databases (Grávalos, 1993). 
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 Growth in such ‘non-obligational’ outsourcing agreements and creation of saving 
bank consortia reflected the limits to which smaller savings banks could 
disproportionately enjoy the benefits of CECA. The result was that CECA 
concentrated on services required for small savings banks to achieve critical scale in 
several IT dimensions and thus increasingly provided the basis for competitive 
advantage.  
 In brief, services provided by CECA became a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for individual market success. CECA's services provided the savings banks 
with the necessary flexibility to anticipate a competitive advantage but it was up to the 
individual caja management teams to identify the most promising growth 
opportunities.  
 On the other hand, CECA delivered several types of services and effectively 
acted as a forum for the savings banks’ top and middle managers. The continuous 
interaction at CECA allowed the exchange of market information, identification of 
competitive concerns of mutual interest (such as new entrants, technological changes 
or development of new skills), and mutual understanding of partners' broad 
capabilities. All these features allowed the Spanish alliance to re-negotiate more often 
than the British alliance. 
7 Conclusion       
 Research results thus support the idea that competitive collaboration can enable 
the creation of inter-organisational processes and procedures to distribute otherwise 
inaccessible information. The development and transformation of competitive 
capabilities of one or all of the partners, therefore, should be seen as the appropriate 
indicator for successful collaboration (Ross, 2002b).  However, the intensity of 
competition could remain unchanged unless opportunities opened by collaboration are 
implemented successfully (Bátiz-Lazo and Del Angel, 2003; Bátiz-Lazo, 2004).  
 In summary, the evolving nature of competitive collaboration and any form of 
inter-organisational dynamics is the motivation for analysing cases with an historical 
perspective. An historical view of an economic problem requires interweaving 
conceptual structures with contextual events and identifying how and why transitions 
appear. In this sense the research that follows aims to bring the history back to the 
concepts using as evidence comparative historical cases in Spain and the UK. Rather 
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than providing an explanatory hypothesis to a problem, it aims to show how and why 
those business practices emerged in their respective contexts and explain their 
outcome in the light of conceptual tools. 
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1 The ‘Mount of Piety’ is a different organisational form from the so-called ‘Montepío’, which 
appeared during the second half of the 18th century The ‘Montepío’ was a mutual, agnostic, and 
government controlled institution established by craftsmen or lesser standing professionals to care for 
members' needs when disabled or rehabilitating Aguilar Piñal (1975), p. . For further details on popular 
credit see Montero  Montero (1983), p.   and Martínez Soto Martínez Soto (2001), p. . 
2 The first generation of stored program computers built on vacuum tubes (valves) between 1940 and 
1956. The second generation built on transistors between 1956 and 1963. The third generation built on 
semi -conductors and introduced compatible software applications (circa 1964). The fourth generation 
built on integrated circuits and database management applications (circa 1971). Since then computer 
technology has built upon microprocessors.  
3The Times, 25 April 1972. 
4 The Times, 02 May 1968. 
5 The Times, 12 January 1970, 19 January 1970 and 15 Oct 1970. By October 1970 the NDPS centre in 
Leeds was servicing 23 TSB banks and was said to be in the process of  incorporating into the 
computer system 450,000 accounts and 45,000 standing orders. 
6 The Times, 15 Oct 1970. 
7 Ferry Ferry (2003), p.  claims that in 1965 Nick Smith, head of the Organisation and Methods 
Department at the Post Office, purchased two LEO III and five LEO 326 to “equip the National Data 
Processing Service centres, manage the accounts in the National Savings Bank … and carry out work 
for outside users.” (p.185). “By 1969, the Post Office had installed thirteen LEO III and 326s at centres 
around the country.” (p. 186). The TSB certainly benefited from experience at NDPC. This even 
though there was no evidence to suggest that applications for the trustee savings banks actually were 
carried out within LEO mainframes nor that they were the same as those originally developed to 
service the 22 million account holders at the National Savings Bank. 
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8 The Times, 25 April 1972. 
9 The Times, 22 January 1974, p. 19. 
10  Unless otherwise stated this paragraph borrows freely from English English (1972), p. . 
11 The Times, 25 Apr 1972. Advertising on page IV. 
12 The Times, 22 Jan 1974, p. 19. 
13 The Times, 29 May 1975, p. 17. 
14 The Times, 29 May 1975, p. 17. 
15 The Times, 29 May 1975, p. 17. 
16 The social welfare activity of the ‘Mount of Piety’ was not profitable enough as loans secured with clothing and 
jewels earned interest for the savings banks at a very low rate, and the savings banks themselves looked for the 
means of reducing the cost to the public. The use of surplus capital was one of the Achilles heels of Spanish 
savings banks during much of the 19th century Martínez Soto (2003), p. . It became necessary to develop new 
lending instruments in order to guarantee the financial sustainability of the savings banks. 
17 The recovery in the activity of the ‘Mount of Piety’ was enhanced by the Royal Decrees of 23 
September 1908 and 12 July 1909 which regulated loan houses, restricting and controlling their 
activities. These regulations were a new attack on abusive interest rates and usury in general. 
18 The recovery in the activity of the ‘Mount of Piety’ was enhanced by the Royal Decrees of 23 
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